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SPINOZA AND MEDIEVAL PHILOSOPHY
BY RICHARD MCKEON
WITHIN the last fifty years scholars have brought to light
materials which make it possible to trace the course of
Spinoza's life and the evolution of his thought with reasonable
accuracy. It is somewhat more difficult however to be sure, from
the same data, of the precise antecedents of his thought. The
sources of his speculations are implied in a general way, or some-
times are even named, in his works. Moreover, the inventory of
the books that formed his library has fortunately been preserved
to us, and consequently doctrines may be traced back with some
probability to particular authors if the books of those authors are
to be found on the list. Nevertheless though it is obvious that we
would understand Spinoza's thought better if we could be sure what
in the works of the philosophers he read influenced him, there is
very little on which to base conclusions and scholars have been able
to find evidences of the influence of a most amazing diversity of
men in his works.
Born into the tight orthodoxy of the Portugal Jewish colony of
Amsterdam, Spinoza seems to have spent most of the effort of a
serious youth in absorbing whatever was available of Jewish lore.
There is evidence that there was an abundance of pious men to
guide him in this study,^ and critics have been tempted frequently
to speculations concerning the possible relations between the youth-
ful Spinoza and" Rabbi Saul iMorterira and INIannasseh ben Israel
and Rabbi Aboab. Whatever those relations may have been, he
entered the Jewish school of Amsterdam at the age of seven (1639)
and at the age of twenty-three (1655) he still attended the syna-
1 See for example Kaufmann, Rcvuc dcs Etudes Juives, XXV, 207.
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gogue. He acquired in that time at least a familiarity with the
Bible and with Biblic criticism, with cabalistic speculations to which
he refers in the Tractatus Theologico-Politicus as "those stupidities
of charlatans" and with the Talmud. Biblic criticism would carry
him into whatever was known in Amsterdam of Jewish philosophy
—
to at least a knowledge of Maimonides, of Creskas, of Gersonides,
of ibn Ezra. For the second period of his life, after his excom-
munication from the synagogue (July 27, 1656), we have infor-
mation, in a sense as definite, but also as inconclusive. Clearly he
was widely interested in science; he was influenced by Descartes in
scientific and mathematical speculation and in philosophic method
;
he was impressed by Hobbes in politics and in some points of ethics.
Bacon is mentioned in his letters and there was a copy of the
Sermones Fidelcs in his library and a quotation from the Novum
Organum in his letters ; analogies in doctrines have led to the con-
jecture of Bruno as a possible influence.
But despite the rather definite items which can be assembled as
possible ingredients to the intellectual formation of Spinoza, there
is of course no means of determining the exact history of indebted-
ness and of growth. He would have had to have been much more
self-consciously autobiographical to make possible any precise at-
tributions and incontestably clear lines of influence. We have in-
stead indications in footnotes, letters and the implications con-
cerned in the books he left in his library. For philosophic purposes
that should be enough. Even more, the paucity of evidence makes
imperative an economy which might be recommended on philo-
sophic grounds : borrowing and influences are important in the his-
tory of thought only when they help clarify some doctrine or some
stage of development; the obvious effect of Hobbes' doctrine of
Natural Rights on Spinoza's philosophy is at least as significant as
the fact that a copy of De Cive was found among Spinoza's books,
and the latter fact is important chiefly as it lends additional sub-
stance to the former. It is surely as relevant that Spinoza opposed
some fundamental tenets of Descartes' philosophy as that he quoted
Descartes and read his works. The indebtedness of philosophers is
in doctrines, and ultimately the history of thought is to be traced
in more subtle data than the presence of a book in a scholar's li-
brary or of a quotation from it in his works.
It would be futile, then, to read the history of philosophy for
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prognostications and echoes of Spinoza. Anticipations of his doc-
trines could be found crowded together in wholly impossible places,
since almost any doctrine, read with sufficient detachment, could
be a remote preparation for any other. To insist, however, that
Spinoza's philosophic attitude was defined by the broad learning
he had in Medieval Jewish philosophy is a totally different enter-
prise. Clearly he opposed some of the doctrines that were held al-
most universally by Jewish philosophers, such for example, as the
creation of the world in time. But it is scarcely a question of prin-
ciples or of individual doctrines. If it were, it would be sufficient
to point out that it would have been impossible for a man to assume
the whole body of Medieval principles and be—not original and
constructive—but only consistent. There was no less divergence
in philosophic opinions in the period that separated Isaac Israeli
and Creskas than in a period of four hundred years in any other
philosophic milieu. But the characteristics of a philosophy are fixed
no less surely by the questions that are asked than by the solutions
that are found. The purpose of debate is not only to eliminate
one of the contending doctrines but incidentally to clarify both, and
even the fact that debate is found possible accomplishes some-
thing to that end. In that broader sense Spinoza is unintelligible
without some survey of the discussions of his Medieval predeces-
sors.
There is at least one total similarity in the philosophies that
grew up in the Middle Ages—Arab, Jewish or Christian—that
makes it possible to apply the terms Scholasticism to them all in a
sense that is not entirely empty and imaginative. There is a growth
in them that has for motivation some obscure need, possiblv in-
herent in all religious traditions to interpret themselves and under-
stand themselves. Whatever the motivation, the contact of each of
these monotheistic traditions with the works of the Greeks was to
bring forth in its particular Scholasticism a philosophy which or-
ders the world on a broadly congruent plan. There were, of course,
crossed influences
; Jewish thought derived much from Arabic, and
Christian thought from both ; but even that borrowing was possible
only because the problems and the philosophies were alreadv sur-
prisingly similar. The frameworks are consistently Xeoplatonic,
and the progress of philosophy is usually marked by the degrees
in which Aristotle has been made to fill in the details which are
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included within the frame. Arab, Jewish and Christian thought
elaborated in varying proportions through the centuries syntheses
of Aristotelianism within Neoplatonic schemae. Aristotelian doc-
trines were doomed frequently to combat Neoplatonism, sometimes
to correct it, but, though the history of thought in the Middle Ages
is largely the progressive triumph of Aristotelian doctrines, it suc-
ceeded at no point within the Middle Ages in eliminating it wholly.
The close union of the two strains in each of the traditions can
be explained rather simply. Under the encouragement of the Mo-
hammedan Caliphs, particularly of the Abbasid dynasty which
was founded in 750 A. D., Syrian scholars and physicians translated
the writings of Greek scientists and philosophers into Syriac and
Arabic. It was thus that in medicine Hippocrates and Galen, in
mathematics Euclid, Archimedes and Ptolemy and in philosophy
Aristotle, Theophrastus and Alexander of Aphrodisias became
available to Arab scholars. The matter, the method and the ter-
minology for their philosophizing was found in Aristotle. But
among the works that purported to be of Aristotle were two treat-
ises. The Theology of Aristotle and the Liber de Causis. The first
of these is in reality a series of extracts taken from the Enneades
of Plotinus (Books IV-VI) and the second is borrowed from the
Elementatio Theologica of Proclus.- It was inevitable that Arab
philosophy be cast on Neoplatonic lines, and what is true of the
Arabs is true in the same degree of the Jews, since they were pu-
pils of the Arabs and found almost an identical use for Aristotle.
In fact even Ibn Daud, Maimonides and Gersonides, possibly the
most Aristotelian of the Medieval Jews, preferred to appeal to Al-
farabi or Avicenna or Averroes for authority concerning the Aris-
totelian position, rather than go directly to the works of Aristotle.
The Neoplatonic mark is placed on Christian scholasticism in
a somewhat different fashion. There is a strong Neoplatonic in-
fluence in Augustine, and from him perhaps Christian philosophy
took its particular cast. If later and more direct influence were
needed, there were the translations which John Scotus Erigena
made in the ninth century of the pseudo-Dionysius the Areopagite.
But whatever the origin, there is in subsequent philosophies an or-
dering of the world in which all things are derived from and are
2 See Valentine Rose, Deutsche Litcratwceitnug, p. 843, and Husik, A His-
tory of Medieval Jewish Philosophy, Introduction.
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made to depend on God. In such an ordering a religious tendency
manifests itself in an impatience to snap the universe, which has
scarcely detached itself from the being of God, back into his in-
effable essence. Philosophy is evinced in an inclination to loiter
somewhat along the way by wdiich the soul adventures back to the
source of things. Where the religion is one of salvation, as the
Christian religion is, the world will be noticed only so far as it is
a reflection of the nature of God and so far, therefore, as it may
clarify some detail of the itinerary of the soul back to God. St.
Augustine had in mind more than a criterion of truth when he de-
cided to believe in order to understand and to understand in or-
der to believe ; his concern was not entirely to find a way in which
his capacities might be applied best to the constructed universe but
to find the most efficient realization of the end of man—salvation.^
Philosophy interposes itself in the flux and reflux of the world out
of God and back to God, and from that interposition problems of
a purely philosophic nature emerge ; the relation of an eternal crea-
tion to a temporal existence, the nature of human knowledge, in-
volving in its superior forms manifestations of ideas by God, in its
inferior forms the action of individual things, and the analysis of
the ends of man. These are questions which become finally con-
siderations of true and false, good and evil and of the relation of
reason and faith.
In general the form of the philosophy of Spinoza shows signs
of having grown from such a pattern. There is at least a relation-
ship close enough to lead, say, to the visiting of the accusation of
pantheism on the head of John Scotus Erigena for the very rea-
sons given when it is applied to Spinoza.^ Thus Henry Bett
(Johannes Scotus Erigena, p. 194) would have him influenced either
by Bruno (who may not have read Erigena but professed himself
a disciple of Nicholas of Cusa who had) or by the Kabbalists who
wrote the Zoltar (which presents coincidents with Erigena's doc-
trines.) And startling improbabilities in the history of thought
may be eliminated by considering this triply intermingling line of
3 See dc Lib. Arb. 1. II, c. ii. and Epistola CXX, c. i. The introduction
of St. Augustine is not irrelevant to the formation of Spinoza's thought,
since there was a copy of an Epitome Augustini Opcrnm Omnium in his
library.
4 There have been critics sufficiently impressed by the similarities of the
philosophies of Christian writers and Spinoza to establish rather fantastic pos-
sibilities of connection between them.
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Scholasticism, accumulating bits of classical philosophies and mov-
ing down the ages to emerge in different centuries with a con-
stantly fuller Aristotelianism bulging from a Neoplatonic frame.
Such a view may be effective in quieting some of the critical appre-
hensions concerning Spinoza's Neoplatonism; it definitely mini-
mizes the curious and rather recent insistence on Bruno's possibly
dominating influence. Finally it makes the Spinozistic mysticism,
instead of an anomalous addition, the natural outgrowth of the ra-
tionalistic Ethics: for in high scholasticism, mysticism and ration-
alism are in the same description of things, save that mysticism pre-
fers to contemplate the return of the soul to God, while rational-
ism makes the same journey more slowly and discursively that it
may also satisfy its curiosity concerning the soul and the grounds
of its knowledge. So Spinoza is no more a contradictory devel-
opment out of Jewish Scholasticism than Duns Scotus out of
Christian, and both crown their high intellectual vision with a mys-
tic contemplation.
It is needless to determine more than this concerning Spinoza's
antecedents. We know from the inventory of his library that he
had copies of Maimonides' Guide to the Perplexed, Manasseh ben
Israel's Esperanca de Israel and Leon Abarbanel's (Leo Hebraeus)
Dialogos de amor. There is little direct reference in Spinoza to
his Hebrew sources, except in matters that concern Biblical crit-
icism. His quotations in that field, however, are so numerous and
widely distributed as to indicate a broad knowledge of Hebrew phi-
losophies. He cites Maimonides, ibn Ezra, Gersonides, Hasdai
Creskas, Juda Alfa 'Har and Abraham ben David. When he re-
fers to them in philosophic connections it is always done familiarly.
But even a cursory glance down the succession of Medieval phi-
losophies would be enough to mark certain family resemblances.
In all of them God is the source of things, and though there are
many differences concerning the way in which the world emerges,
by emanation or by some manner of creation, the qualities that ex-
ist in things fall, as a result of God's action or his mere being, into
fixed relations to each other, and the world is made in some way
to represent or reflect attributes merged in God. God is simultane-
ously the source of all being and all intelligibility, so a nice par-
allelism of logic and ontology must run through nature. God de-
fines the being of things and from him flows the power that moti-
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vates the whole sequence of movement in physical objects; he is
the idea that gives meaning to all things that follow from him.
They are and are known at the same time and by means of the
same derivation from him. God is therefore reflected on all sides
and by all things ; that things are and that they should be under-
stood, are equally manifestations of him.
It is back this course out of God that the soul is to travel to a
salvation of some sort, depending on the tradition, and on the
century and phase of the tradition. The Christians developed a
neat Trinitarian arrangement, and there were special signs of God
in the triple manifestations of him in nature: in the being of things
and the logic of things and in the moral way to God. For St.
Augustine, God was the source of being as creator, of truth as in-
tellectual light, and finally of moral goodness by his grace; he was
the cause of the constituted universe and the light for perceiving
truth and the fountain for imbibing felicit}'. From that, in fact,
came the triple division of philosophy into the sciences of Being,
of Truth and of Good; into Physics, Logic and Morals. The Medi-
eval Jewish tradition evolved no such stylized form, yet it had the
same problems to face ; what is the relation of God to the world and
what is the reality of the attributes we ascribe to him ? Sometimes,
as in the case of Saadia, precisely the three attributes were chosen
for God—life, power and knowledge. But even in other cases the
dangers no less than the solutions are sufficiently similar to permit
each tradition to learn something from the other in late scholasti-
cism. The pathway to the contemplation of God is marked and the
universe is laid on a definitely similar plan. It is significant that
Spinoza's thoughts on God bear kinship at some point to the doc-
trines of all the great Medieval theologians. But the fact that, say,
Israeli might be quoted to elucidate Spinoza's doctrine of God does
not force the rest of their doctrine to similar conclusions ; the psy-
chologies expounded by the two philosophers are notably different.
So too, in the field of God's influence on man, Spinoza may follow
Creskas in his doctrine of man's freedom ; how far precisely, would
be difficult to determine, but the further doctrine that love, not in-
tellect, is the essence of the soul^ need not be a necessary conse-
quence, even despite the fact that in the mystic regions where the
soul approaches God. being, love and intellect are no more dis-
tinguishable in the soul than they are in God.
136 THE OPEN COURT
The innovations then which are to be, found in Spinoza's phi-
losophy do not fall out of the line of innovations that had heejn
made through all the Middle Ages. They follow out of the suc-
cession of readjustments of dogma and reason, of religion and
philosophy. Philosophy had long been concerned with the unity of
things, and it was neither out of deference nor by accident that
it chose to turn to God and the tmity in God. But there were condi-
tions to be fulfilled before reason could be admitted to religion.
On the one hand intellectual explanations were to be employed on
the traditional documents, and even intellectual ideals and virtues
were to be introduced into the tradition. This meant on the other
hand the fitting of characteristically religious doctrines to the uni-
verse: rewards and punishments, even if they were inscrutable,
were henceforth to be meted out in accordance with the system of
things ; intellectual conditions as well as moral ones had to be ful-
filled before the soul could return to its source; it was to be freed
from the body by intellectual excellence and right conduct. Judah
Halevi and Creskas are the only outstanding exceptions to the com-
mon opinion that religion and philosophy are identical in content
and different only in method. Israeli defined philosophy as self-
knowledge and keeping from evil. When a man knows himself, he
knows everything; and the transvaluation has only to be made
—
the aim of life is to become like God. Religion could make the in-
tellect the sign of God
;
philosophy in its turn could lend a logi-
cal intelligibility to God's workings.
The place of God in the universe was too obvious to permit his
existence to be questioned in any intelligible sense. Even when
his existence was proved, the logical proofs were usually only
more definite illustrations of a definite fact. The significant prob-
lem is the relation of God to the universe. Maimonides, in fact,
considers God's attributes first^ then his existence, so that existence
becomes only an attribute of God and the least uncertain of them.
All God's attributes, considering God in himself, existence, unity,
life, omnipotence, omniscience and others, must merge to the ex-
tent that all multiplicity is excluded from them. The very essence
of God includes his existence. The only question related to the at-
tributes of God on which opposition was to develop during the
Middle Ages was the question of how we come to know them and
what significance they can have without endangering God's unity
:
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clearly the attributes we assign to him do not indicate positive
qualities distinct in him but are negations or signs of honor or
have some undistinguished grounds in him, and though the debate
was hot and constant, it was hardly questioned that God is, or that
a plurality of attributes means, not that God is many, but that he
acts or he is represented in many ways and that he is characterized
by them.
Pure speculation furnishes warrant enough for the existence of
God, and from such inferentially-ballasted belief in God, additional
proofs, strewn through all nature, follow necessarily. The argu-
ments shift easily from the realm of logic to evidences in fact.
The differences of the arguments may be reduced ultimately to the
question of whether they are derived primarily from Aristotle or
are influenced more by the late Neoplatonic contemplation of Unity.
If the philosophy is markedly Platonic the proper examination of
the idea of God will adduce warrant for his existence; if it is Aris-
totelian, corroboration must be sought on the surfaces of life, for
each thing and each event will be possible and conceivable only by
a necessary nature. Most Platonic philosophies will furnish a basis
for cogent a priori proofs and it was these that Spinoza was to
follow. Both Creskas and ibn Daud considered that God's existence
was proved conclusively by the distinction between necessary and
possible existence. But on the other hand, ibn Daud was good
enough Aristotelian to insist on the proof by the necessity of a
prime mover; ibn Zaddik began with the consideration of the con-
tingency of the world ; Saadia, Bahya and ibn Pakuda began their
proofs from the fact that the world is composite. So there are
logical manifestations of God in his world and physical evidences.
Out of the unity which is God the manifold world proceeds accord-
ing to the conditions of existence that just his being imposes on it.
God is the principle of order and of law in the world of particular
things. Joseph ibn Zaddik thought God must be single because
the cause of many things must be one, and consistent with that he
insisted that the study of theology be preceded by a knowledge of
the sciences. Alaimonides too, held that a knowledge of physics
and metaphysics was indispensable to a knowledge of God. And
it should be remembered that Spinoza once said that everyone
knows that ethics must be based on physics and metaphysics.
Yet the problem on which there was perhaps most variation
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in ^Medieval Jewry was concerned with the way in which the world
was related to God. The multitude of particular things could not
be affected directly by this unity that is God ; his efficacy had al-
ways to find some intermediary principles and usually the universe
was formed in some graduated hierarchy. Ibn Daud insisted that
the world to exist at all, had to exist in just the graduated series
in which it actually does. But there is no general agreement
among Jewish philosophers concerning the number or the nature
of the interpositions which are necessary between unity and di-
versity; where the transition is made by Neoplatonic emanations,
as in the case of Maimonides, there are frequently ten stages. Yet
there are elements that are fairly constant among the variations
of the schema—the inclusive unity which is God, his defining in-
telligence (with sometimes the addition of a soul) Nature and the
corporeal world. Sometimes the mediations between God and the
world are accomplished by way of the attributes of God, and
eternal matter and their modifications. Creskas, in that fashion,
held that there was an infinite extension connected with and op-
posed to the infinite intelligence of God. Extension was not itself
bodily nor made up of parts, and there existed beside it an eternal
matter which was qualified by it; the act of creation was only the
ordering of this matter. It requires no great violence to the sub-
ject matter to fit Spinoza into the discussion of this problem.
In some form or other, then, God is usually manifested in Na-
ture, and the manifestation is such that the universe by existing
is essentially rational. To exist, a thing must be intelligible. But
not only is everything by its very essence capable of being known,
but knowledge by that same fact is part of the world; each thing
is so related to God that it aspires, as it were, to be known ; Na-
ture, in man, grows into its own comprehension. Anything known
is referred to God ; there are regularities in the processes by
which things are altered in the Sublunar world. Each time a law
of nature or a concept of logic is discovered in experience, another
indication of God has been noticed. He is the ultimate principle
regulating all laws by only thinking all things. By that very fact,
of course, it is clear that his attributes are difficult to name since a
universal principle would have no particular determinations that
could be described. But the logic of the Jewish Medieval philos-
ophers was one they found in the world ; it was no longer an Aris-
totc'lian instrument applicable to the world; it was in things and
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things were arranged in precise concatenations. The metaphysics
of Aristotle had, by the exigencies of doctrinal monotheism and
through the offices of Neoplatonism, become a cosmolog\ and the
Oryanon had come to lay the ground plans for a metaphysics. It
was not that things were thought to exist in designated genus and
species—these were abstract ideas and repudiated as such by most
Jewish philosophers—but there were accurate interrelations by
which one thing was connected with another and implied by it.
Ultimately they were embraced in the complete unity which was in
turn implied by these interconnections. In this fashion Aristotle
had been iitted to the Xeoplatonic universe. The process was com-
pleted somewhat earlier in Jewish philosophy than in Christian,
for Aristotle was known earlier in the Jewish than in the Christian
tradition ; it was never carried to a perfect conclusion, since even
in late scholasticism, Aristotle was known only imperfectly, by
texts that were sometimes fragmentary and misconceived, often of
an authenticity that was m_\thical and always with a bias set rather
by Avicenna and Averroes than by Aristotle.
An object, when God knows it, participates in the logical or-
dering of the universe, for it means precisely that for God to
know. To insist that God knows all things is to maintain the com-
plete intelligibility of the universe. All things exist with logical
references to other things and to general principles. If God is,
as he frequently is in ^Medieval Jewish philosophy, the source by-
way of the Intelligence, of the Active Intellect, it is he who gives
content, on the one hand, to the rational powers of man, and on the
other endows sublunar nature with purpose and intelligence. It
is natural that men, placed in that ordered world, be endowed with
abilities to appreciate both the world and its order : so he mav
consider individual things living each its life and undergoing its
particular evolution or he may contemplate the rational principles
under which all the processes of growth and decay are arranged.
He may reflect on things similar to himself and on creatures pos-
sessed of bodies like his own developing his practical reason by
such reflections, or he may face upward to the realm of pure ra-
tionality and receive wisdom from the angels or the Active intel-
lect, developing in that way his intellectual knowledge.
The beginning of man's existence is the beginning too of his
knowledge, for he begins to think at the same moment and for
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the same reason as he begins to exist. His first knowledge is a
sensitive knowledge of the bodies about him through the interme-
diary of his own body; he can not be insensitive to things that
affect him and he can be affected by anything like himself. What-
ever thing is similar to his body is potentially an object of his
knowledge; as the human body is the most perfect one conceiv-
able, it bears some similarity to all physical objects and nothing
material is beyond the scope of man's knowledge. As ibn Daud
put it, the soul is an indivisible form, the first entelechy of the
natural body, arising in connection with the body and realizing
and actualizing it. The soul of man is exactly suited to the mix-
ture of elements which makes up his body. The early Jewish phi-
losophers held specifically that the human soul can arrive at a
great development and a broad knowledge because the human
body resembles all manners of plants and animals; in many state-
ments the human body is a microcosm.
Man knows particular things through the encounters of his
body with other bodies and through the sensations which are the
result of those encounters. This is the beginning of his practical
knowledge; in this manner things are known, their courses and se-
quences may be traced and means of controlling them discovered.
In addition to this practical knowledge, there are intellectual pow-
ers which the soul possesses through the perfection its body has
conferred on it ; it is elevated to such perfection that it is the form
nearest the eternal forms and it can reach therefore to the system
of significations which orders, like laws, the existence of things.
The intellect is indebted to sensations and to bodily functions only
for the initial ideas it acquires. Sensation and reason are as far
apart as body and mind; their functions are as separate as the
particular and the universal ; sensation perceives the form of the
individual thing, while the intellect, inspired by the data of sensa-
tions, apprehends the nature which makes things essentially what
they are. Here again there is opportunity for disagreement be-
tween the Platonist and the Aristotelian, the former holding that
all knowledge is derived directly in some fashion from universal
ideas innate in the soul, the latter that the intellect works over the
data of sensation and abstracts its general ideas. But whatever
the solution to that problem, there arise the different ways of know-
ing: practical knowledge from the fact that we meet and react
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to other individuals, intellectual knowledge from the fact that in-
dividuals are nevertheless intelligible and have meanings which
come from their place in the logical system. The intellect grasps
truths immediately, while the practical intelligence forms precepts
from experience. So the decision of the intellect concerns truth
and falsity; the practical intellect pronounces a thing good and
bad, and it can be good or bad, obviously, only as it affects some
sensitive being; in the unit}' of the eternal being such an affection
would have no place.
The acquired intellect depends then on the sensitive soul for
its existence only; its manner of receiving knowledge is separate
from it. It stands to the sensitive soul in much the relation that,
till recently, the soul had stood to the body in modern philosophy.
But in the JMiddle Ages the distinctness of the functions was more
sharp. The intellect is not receptive in the manner that the senses
are ; it is not a function of the body. The act of reason is purely
immaterial, a proceeding from premise to conclusion or wholly in-
tuitive. Thinking is not done by means of corporeal organs, but
just as there is a real and actual object to arouse the senses to per-
ception, so there is an actual intelligible object to arouse the intel-
lect to comprehension. Individual things could no more endow
man's rational capacity with actual ideas than a surface could en-
dow his sight with the sensation of color if there were no light.
God or the Active Intellect is to the mind what light is to the
senses, or to be more Aristotelian, the Active Intellect is the faculty
by which sense experience is converted to concepts. So knowledge
is possible ; the senses are concerned wdth particular things and
their accidents; there can be no knowledge of such things, but rea-
son and intellect perceive essences and are concerned with the
universal and the permanent.
The mind passes into actuality through the knowledge acquired
from the Active Intellect ; the birth of the soul is intellectual.
Abraham ibn Daud resorts to the frequent metaphor comparing
the soul to sight ; without light vision is potential ; light makes it
actual. So the Active Intellect makes the potential soul actual and
gives it first the axioms which are universally certain and hence
could not have originated from experience. The transition from
imaginative or practical knowledge to the intellectual knowledge is
the origin of the soul. Now the mind can recognize the systematic
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unity which connects all things into one whole, for it comes upon,
not only ideas, but an understanding of their relations one to the
other. The principles of the universe are known through the same
immaterial power by which they were set. God shows his efficacy
at once in the logical principles by which things are understood
and in the logical, or even teleological, ordering of events in their
actual processes. Particular souls exist only by virtue of a uni-
versal soul
;
particular minds can operate because a universal mind
has set down the implications they discover of the Intelligence
whence all being absolutely and all intelligibility flow. The mind
can know only by virtue of something analogous to it in the things
it knows.
In the beginning, then, the soul is only a capacity, a potential
intellect, which is so intimately connected with the body that it
shares the body's mortality. Sensations, which are bodily activi-
ties, are the first intimations of knowledge, and by knowledge the
soul comes into being, so that the beginning of knowledge is the
first intimation of immortality. The rational soul can attain to the
Active Intellect, and having thus become an actual intellect, no
longer potential, it is dependent for its ideas, thenceforth, not on
its body, but on the Intellect that is the ordering principle of the
universe. The rational soul is identical with the ideas it has : there
is only one idea in the part and in the whole, in man's intellect
and the whole, in man's intellect and the infinite intellect ; that idea
is equally and at the same time comprehended by man and present
perfectly in the Active Intellect. The more perfect the soul be-
comes, the more closely it cleaves to the Active Intellect and fas-
tens there on the logic of the universe and on all intelligibility, for
the Active Intellect bears in itself the form of all existing things.
Clearly this process of knowing must be immaterial ; there can be
no entrance of the body into logical sequences.
The aim of ethical endeavor becomes obvious ; to return the
soul to the upper world to which it belongs. All things in the
world tend naturally to God, and intellect in man is the instrument
which permits him to return most completely. So far as the soul
succeeds in identifying itself with immaterial Ideas it is indestruc-
tible. The aim is obscured by the entrance of the soul into the
body. But the body is a necessary incident in the biography of
human knowledge ; from the knowledge of individuals which the
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soul has by its body, it is recalled to the higher knowledge of eternal
truths and ceases to be dependent on the body though its thinking
began with it. Whether or not there would be any adecjualc in-
tuition of the absolute truth is a question on which neither Arab
nor Jewish scholastics could agree; some philosophers, among
them Maimonides, insisted that God could not be known, others,
like Avicenna, Algazali and ibn Tofail, that such knowledge was
possible.
Whatever the solution to that problem, there was greater unan-
imity in the answers to the more significant problem of the rela-
tions of God's knowledge to man's. In God, thought, thinker and
object of thought are one. God knows all things before the\- come
into existence and his knowledge does not change as things appear
and disappear. But man in even his most perfect knowledge must
remain an individual and so, there must be always a separation
of himself as subject from the object of his knowledge. ]\Iaimoni-
des held that only the absolutely non-existent can not be known
;
things which only happen not to exist can be known since thev
have their being in God's knowledge and he brings them into real-
ity. God is the cause of the phenomena which are the data of ex-
perience, and those phenomena follow according to the laws and
principles of his knowledge. In man, on the contrary, knowledge
follows from experience. God knows all things knowing simpl\-
himself, and all things conform to and illustrate the efficacy of that
self-knowledge. The problem moreover of the relation of man's
knowledge to the world has its answer in this action of God's
knowledge.
But since God is omniscient man can hardl}- be free, if freedom
is to mean complete indetermination. God knows all things, but
there was some hesitation concerning whether he could know the
changing individual as well as the changeless principles that gov-
ern it. Evil in the world would seem in the presence of God's
knowledge a criticism of his goodness, and if man is not free to
choose how he will act, the punishment of his transgressions would
seem to be little consistent with God's equity. Since it seemed pos-
sible to save God's goodness only at the cost of his wisdom, arch-
rationalists did not hesitate to leave the opposition unsolved. Mai-
monides said that God was omniscient and man free and that
neither statement should be denied only because it or the relation
between it and the other was not understood. Spinoza took a
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somewhat similar position in his defense of Descartes' doctrine of
the freedom of the soul. His position in his own works was differ-
ent from the first ; "the slavery of a thing," he says in the Short
Treatise, "consists in its being subject to external causes, while
freedom on the other hand consists in its not being subject to them
but freed from them." According to Joel, the study of the philos-
ophy of Creskas had brought him to a realization that God's om-
nipotence is incompatible with man's freedom. Creskas had
solved the problem by curtailing the sense of human freedom. The
act of will, he said, is in a sense free and in a sense contingent;
but it is determined by its causes. The act of will, no more than
any other act, is not fated to take place cause or no cause; if the
cause is granted the act of will is necessary, but if the cause is re-
moved it can not occur. Spinoza's conception was probably in-
spired by Creskas' statement, but still his emphasis, as in other
problems, was distinct from that made by the Middle Ages. More-
over it is one which he never changed. Even in the Short Treat-
ise he defines freedom as the power of the soul by which it is able
to develop ideas in itself and produce results outside itself which
correspond with its nature and the production of which is not
altered by external interference.
Doctrines such as these and the discussions of them must have
attracted Spinoza in his study of Medieval Jewish philosophy. It
would be purposeless to try to determine from which of them spe-
cifically his own thought developed. It is safe to assume that he
knew them. Certainly he took up problems that are noticeably sim-
ilar. His solutions are not always precisely these, but then, almost
every doctrine that has been outlined in the preceding paragraphs
in the name of Jewish philosophy could be contradicted by some
specific text from some philosopher. A comprehensive statement
of Medieval Jewish philosophy could no more be made than a com-
prehensive statement of modern philosophy, and for precisely the
same reason that contradictions could be found at every point.
Even so general an outline is no more than broadly congruent with
Spinoza's conceptions. Spinoza's position was unorthodox in
many questions, some of them important ones—the creation of
the world in time, prophecy, miracles, God's knowledge, his provi-
dence and his attributes, the freedom of the will, the immortality
of the soul, rewards and punishments. But his departures too
could be fitted into some orthodoxy if care and erudition were to
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be employed so poorly. Many of Spinoza's novelties were antici-
pated with the Hebrew tradition. Ibn Ezra, ibn Gabirol and Ger-
sonides denied creation ex nihilo ; the latter two maintained the
eternity of matter. Creskas held that God had an attribute of ex-
tension, and denied the validity of final causes ; like ibn Ezra he
taught a complete determinism. Some of the Jewish m\stics held
that Nature is animated. Maimonides denied personal immortality,
insisting instead on the immortality of the single Active Intellect:
he also taught the relativity of good and evil. Then too, other influ-
ences than Medieval Jewish philosophy entered into the forma-
tion of Spinoza's thought ; and the logical development he sought,
required, for the solution of his problems, mechanisms in which
considerations of orthodoxy were irrelevant.-' But if Spinoza's
philosophy is approached without an awareness of this history that
lies behind it, it must lose its fine virtues of philosophic pertinence
and insight and become, as it does in the hands of most modern
critics, a hardly explicable confusion illuminated by only occasional
flashes.
^ Professor Harry Wolfson has announced a book to be entitled Spinoza,
the Last of the Medievals which will take up the detail of the Medieval ante-
cedents of Spinoza. Three very illuminating chapters have already appeared
in the first three numbers of the CJironicon Spinozanum.
